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A Centralized Approach to Modelling Collective Household 
Decisions: some preliminary results 
 
Rolf Aaberge*, Ugo Colombino† and Federico Perali‡ 
 
1. Introduction 
Since the path-breaking contributions by Chiappori (1988, 1992), many authors have made 
attempts to estimate empirical versions of the collective labour supply model and use them 
for tax reform simulations. The most common approach is the so-called decentralized 
(sharing rule) representation of the collective household program: among others, see the 
applications and the survey by Vermeulen (2006) and Bloemen (2010).  This representation 
exploits the fact that the collectively optimal intra-household allocation can be interpreted as 
the result of the partners’ decentralized decisions complemented by intra-household transfers 
(a close analogy to the Second Welfare Theorem). The main motivation for adopting the 
decentralized representation is avoiding arbitrary assumptions upon the household’s 
collective decision process. Typically, the private consumptions of the two partners are not 
observed. Therefore, private consumptions are defined as total consumption (observed) plus 
(or minus) a transfer. The so-called sharing rule is embodied into the transfer and reflects the 
intra-household distributive preferences and/or the partners’ bargaining power. Under certain 
conditions, the sharing rule can be identified. Empirically, it is usually specified by a 
“flexible” reduced form including all exogenous variable that are thought to be relevant for 
the intra-household decision process. This procedure – that was proposed as a convenient one 
for estimation and simulation – has however two crucial drawbacks that in principle make it 
inappropriate for the very same type of applications that are thought to be mostly relevant for 
this family of models, i.e. tax reform simulations.  
The first problem concerns the decentralized representation itself. The possibility of 
decentralizing the maximization of household welfare rests on the convexity of the budget 
sets. However, both the actual tax systems and the tax reforms might imply significant non-
convexities: this makes the decentralized representation in general inappropriate both for 
estimation and for simulation. Surprisingly, most of the empirical applications barely mention 
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the problem en passant, as if it were a theoretical rarum, while in fact the treatment of non-
convexities has been a major focus of the empirical analysis of tax reforms. Vermeulen et al. 
(2006) address the issue in the context of a simulation exercise and adopt a calibration 
approach. Beninger (2008) makes an attempt to overcome the problem by adopting a 
centralized representation, but he treats the share of income among the partners as a 
parameter rather than as a decision. Bargain and Moreau (2013) adopt a Nash-bargaining 
approach but use a calibrated model. 
The second problem concerns the specification of the sharing rule, which typically is not a 
structural one, but rather a reduced form, e.g. a combination of exogenous variables (wage 
rates, unearned incomes etc.). Such a specification might provide a reasonable approximation 
to the current intra-household allocation choices under the current tax rule, but in general it 
cannot be used for simulating the effects of a different tax rule (Donni 2003). Analogously, 
the sharing rule in general will be different depending on whether both partners work or not 
(Blundell et al. 2007).  
In summary, if we want to develop empirical models that are useful for tax simulation and 
adopt the collective approach it seems that we cannot escape from (a) a centralized 
representation of household decisions and (b) a structural representation of the intra-
household allocation program. Point (b) is necessary for the simulation of tax systems 
substantially different from the current one, while point (a) is required only under non-convex 
(current or simulated) budget sets.   
In section 2 we use a very simple example to derive the structural form of the “sharing rule” 
and to show that in general it changes when the tax rule changes. In section 3 we examine 
different empirical strategies that could be used to specify and estimate a centralized and 
structural representation of the collective labour supply model. In section 4 we illustrate an 
empirical application.  
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2. Centralized and decentralized representation of the intra-household allocation 
As a simple illustration, let us consider the following scenario with no taxes (or, equivalently, 
with proportional taxation) and no public goods. Leisure is assumed to be a private good. The 
representation is then conditional on these assumptions (Chiappori and Meghir 2014). Let li 
be leisure time of member i=f,m and Ci be total expenditure or income of each member of the 
household couple. 
   
   
f f
m m
b a
f f f
b a
m m m
U l C
U l C


     (1)
 
 = wife's wage rate
 = husband's wage rate
 = wife's exogenous income
 husband's exogenous income
 = total available time for each partner
ln ln = household's welfare function, 
where  is t
f
m
f
m
f m
w
w
I
I
T
W U U


 
he relative Pareto weight given to the husband's utility.
 
Equivalently, we might define , (1 )f mC C C C    , where  is the consumption or 
resource share, and write the utility functions as 
 
   
   (1 )
f f
m m
b a
f f
b a
m m
U l C
U l C



 
   (2) 
Note that  is the result of household decisions: how to allocate consumption among the two 
partners. Instead  is a parameter of the household’s (social) preferences. Obviously, there is 
a relationship between  and  that will be derived below. 
The household solves the following centralized program 
  
   
max ln ln
. .
f m
f m f f m m
W U U
s t
C C w T l w T l I
 
     
  (3) 
Assuming an interior solution, the FOCs are: 
 
   
f f
m m
f f f
m m m
f m f f m m f m
a C
a C
b w l
b w l
C C w T l w T l I I

 

 




      
      (4) 
where  is the Lagrange multiplier. 
m
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Therefore 
   f m f m f f m m f m f m f ma a b b w l w l C C w w T I I                  
and 
 
 
 
 
*
*
*
* .
f m f mf
f
f m f m f
f
f f m f m
f m f m
f m f mm
m
f m f m m
m
m f m f m
f m f m
w w T I Ib
l
a a b b w
a
C w w T I I
a a b b
w w T I Ib
l
a a b b w
a
C w w T I I
a a b b
 
 

 

 
  

  
       
  

  
       
   (5)  
      
Therefore, for example, the wife’s share in consumption is:  
*
*
f f
f m
C a
C a a


 

,        (6) 
where one can see the relationship between  and  . 
The wife’s leisure share is: 
*
*
f f m
f m m f
l b w
l b w b w


.        (7) 
Note that the above results can also be interpreted as the solution to a Nash-bargaining 
procedure where   represents the husband’s bargaining power.  
Turning to the decentralized representation, the partners maximize their own utility but their 
budget constraints include transfers that allow them to reach the same efficient solution 
attained by the centralized program.  
      Max f fb af f f f f fU l C C w T l             (8) 
      Max m mb am m m m m mU l C C w T l     , 
where  denotes the intra-household transfer.  
Again, we only consider interior solutions: 
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 
,
,
f f f
f
f f f
f
f f f
f f
m m m
m
m m m
m
m m m
m m
b w T I
l
a b w
a
C w T I
a b
b w T I
l
a b w
a
C w T I
a b








 


    
 


  

        (9) 
By imposing the decentralized solution to be equal to the centralized one, we can see what 
the appropriate transfer is. From 
  *f ff f f f m f m f
f f f m f m
a a
C w T I w w T I I C
a b a a b b

 
                
  
we obtain: 
   * f f f m f m f f
f m f m
a b
w w T I I w T I
a a b b

 

         
.    (10) 
Note that if =0 the sharing rule is given by the difference between full household labor and 
non-labor income and the income of the female. If the Pareto weight >0, then the household 
budget is scaled up or down depending on the sign and size of the male specific coefficients 
am. and bm. 
The same result can be obtained by using proposition 2 in Browning et al. (2013). Namely, 
we substitute the solutions of the decentralized program into fU  and mU  and derive the 
indirect utilities fV and mV . Then, we maximize ln lnf mW V V
   with respect to .  
In this particular example,  depends only on preference parameters and is therefore 
unaffected by tax-transfer rules. This is an implication of the utility function, where we 
assumed independence between leisure and consumption. However, the sharing rule    
depends on full-incomes: therefore, it does depend on the tax-transfer rule at least to the 
extent that it affects full-incomes. Moreover,   depends also on the participation status of the 
two partners. Let us suppose that the collective allocation requires the wife is not working, 
i.e.: 
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*
*
*
* .
f
f
f m f m
f m f m
m f mm
m
f m f m m
m
m m f m
f m f m
l T
a
C w T I I
a a b b
w T I Ib
l
a a b b w
a
C w T I I
a a b b
 

 

 

      
 

  
  
  
       (11) 
 
Then, the transfer required to implement the optimal allocation as a decentralized solution 
turns out to be: 
 
 * f f m f m f f
f m f m
a b
w T I I w T I
a a b b

 

        
,     (12) 
 
which is different from what required when both partners are working. If a reform of the tax-
transfer rule modifies the participation conditions, then also the sharing rule will change.  
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3. An empirical framework  
In what follows we present an empirical framework for the analysis of collective household 
decisions adopting an explicit centralized representation.  
We assume we have a sample of H households. For each household we observe: 
gh = hours of work of partner of gender g = f, m; 
g gl T h  = hours of leisure of partner of gender g = f, m; 
C = household net disposable income; 
gw = wage rate (actual or potential) of partner of gender g = f, m; 
gI = exogenous income of partner of gender g = f, m; 
gh = hours of work of partner of gender g = f, m; 
Z = vector of socio-demographic characteristics. 
The opportunity set contains J “jobs”  ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ) , 1,...,f m f mh j h j w j w j j J .  
For each job we can compute the household net available income 
 ( ) ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), , ,f m f m f mC j f h j h j w j w j I I Z  
where f represents the tax-transfer rule (possibly dependent on characteristics Z) that 
transforms gross incomes into net available income. 
Leisure and consumption are strictly private goods for the two partners. The household 
allocates ( )C j  to individual consumptions ( ), , .gC j g f m  However, we only observe ( )C j
, not ( ), , .gC j g f m  
As a matter of notational convenience we will write
   ( ) ( ), ( ) 1f mC j C j C j C j    . It is convenient to represent the possible value of  by 
a set of M discrete values  0,1 .  
The alternatives among which the household can choose can now be represented as JM 
“packages”  ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ) , 1,..., , 1,...,f mh j h j C j i j J i M    . 
When the household chooses package  ,j i , the utility levels attained by the partners are 
respectively 
 
 
( ), ( ) ( ), , ( , );
( ),(1 ( )) ( ), , ( , );
f f f f
m m m m
U h j i C j Z j i
U h j i C j Z j i
  
  
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where ( , )f j i and ( , )m j i are random variables measuring unobserved characteristics of the 
package-household match and ,f f  are vectors of parameters to be estimated. The 
corresponding household welfare function is denoted by 
 
     0( ), ( ) ( ), , ( , ); , ( ),(1 ( )) ( ), , ( , ); , ( , ); ( , ; )f f f f m m m m W WW U h j i C j Z j i U h j i C j Z j i j i j i         
 
where ( , )W j i is a random variable measuring specific unobserved household welfare effects 
and W is a vector of parameters specific to the household welfare criterion. 
We write ( , ; )P j i  to denote the probability that package ( , )j i  is chosen given the 
parameters  . Since we assume  is not observed, we must work with the marginal 
probability that job j is chosen, i.e. ( ; ) ( , ; ).
i
P j P j i 
 
In what follows we propose various estimation strategies, all of them exploiting the fact that 
the choices j and i are generated by the same parameters.  
 
 
3.1 A general simulated maximum likelihood procedure  
The choice probabilities will depend on the joint distribution function of the three random 
variables  , ,f m WG     and closed-form expressions in general will not be available for 
computing them. However they can be simulated as follows. For each household: 
1) draw (from G) JM realizations 
     (1), (1), (1) , (2), (2), (2) ,..., ( ), ( ), ( )f m W f m W f m WJ M J M J M           ; 
2) compute  0( , ; ), 1,..., , ;j i j J i M    
3) for any given ( , )j i  , compute  0 0( , ; ) ( , ; ), 1,..., , 1,...,I j i t k t J k M     , where 
I[s] is the indicator function = 1 if s is true and = 0 if s is false; 
4) repeat (1)-(3) R times and let ( , ; )rI j i  be the result of the r-th repetition at step 3. 
5) compute the probability that package ( , )j i is chosen as 
1
1
( , ; ) ( , ; )
R
r
r
P j i I j i
R
 

 ; 
6) compute the probability that job j is chosen as 
1
( ; ) ( , ; )
M
i
P j P j i 

 . 
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The steps (1) – (6) are embedded in an algorithm where the parameters  are iteratively 
updated in order to maximize the sample log-likelihood function. It can be shown that the 
above procedure based on simulated choice probabilities leads to consistent estimates. 
 
3.2 Special cases 
The general procedure sketched in section 3.1 can be implemented in simpler or more special 
forms depending on specific assumptions on the distribution G or on the utility functions or 
on the welfare function. 
Example 1 
Let us suppose the household welfare function can be written as 
    
 1
( ), ( ) ( ), , ; , ( ),(1 ( )) ( ), , ; ;
, , , ;
f f f f m m m m W W
f m W
W U h j i C j Z U h j i C j Z
j i
       
   
 
    
and W is i.i.d. Type I Extreme Value. Given the values of f and m the probability that 
package ( , )j i is chosen is 
  
  
1
1
1 1
exp , , ( , ), ( , );
( , ; )
exp , , ( , ), ( , );
f m
M J
f m
k t
j i j i j i
P j i
t k t k t k
  

  
 



. 
In order to get the unconditional probability we must integrate out the random variables f
and m . To that purpose we can again adopt a simulation approach. 
1) Let  1 ,f mG   be the joint distribution of f and m . Draw JM realizations 
     (1), (1) , (2), (2) ,..., ( ), ( )f m f m f mJ M J M       ; 
2) Repeat R times step (1) and let      (1), (1) , (2), (2) ,..., ( ), ( )fr mr fr mr fr mrJ M J M        
be the r-th repetition; 
3) Compute
  
  
1
1
1
1 1
exp , , ( , ), ( , );1
( , ; )
exp , , ( , ), ( , );
R
fr mr
M J
r
fr mr
k t
j i j i j i
P j i
R
t k t k t k
  

  
 





 
4) Compute the probability that job j is chosen as 
1
( ; ) ( , ; )
M
k
P j P j k 

 . 
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Example 2 
Under the same assumptions of Example 1, we can drop the random variables f and m and 
write
      2( ), ( ) ( ), ; , ( ),(1 ( )) ( ), ; ; , ;f f f m m m W W WW U h j i C j Z U h j i C j Z j i          
 
Then we have 
 
  
  
 
2
2
1 1
1
exp , ;
( , ; )
exp , ;
; ( , ; ).
M J
k t
M
i
j i
P j i
t k
P j P j i



 
 







 
 
Example 3 
We can drop the random variable W and write
 
      2( ), ( ) ( ), , ; , ( ),(1 ( )) ( ), , ; ; , , , ; .f f f f m m m m W f mW U h j i C j Z U h j i C j Z j i          
 
1) draw JM realizations      (1), (1) , (2), (2) ,..., ( ), ( )f m f m f mJ M J M       ; 
2) compute   2 , , , ; , 1,..., , ;f mj i j J i M      
3) for any given ( , )j i  compute 
   2 2, , , ; , , , ; , 1,..., , 1,...,f m f mI j i t k t J k M           , where I[s] is the 
indicator function = 1 if s is true and = 0 if s is false; 
4) repeat (1)-(3) R times and let ( , ; )rI j i  be the result of the r-th repetition at step 3. 
5) compute the probability that package ( , )j i is chosen as 
1
1
( , ; ) ( , ; )
R
r
r
P j i I j i
R
 

 ; 
6) compute the probability that job j is chosen as 
1
( ; ) ( , ; )
M
i
P j P j i 

 . 
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Example 4 
Let us assume 
 
 
ln ln
( ), ( ) ( ), ;
( ),(1 ( )) ( ), ;
f m
f f f f f
m m m m m
W U U
U u h j i C j Z
U u h j i C j Z

  
  
 

 
 
where f and f are i.i.d. Type III Extreme Value. Therefore  
f f m mW u u         
where 
ln( ).u u  
Notice that ,f m  are i.i.d. Type I Extreme Value.  
Given a vector  ( , ), 1,..., , 1,...,m m t k t J k M    , the probability that package ( , )j i is 
chosen is 
 
 
1 1
exp ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , \ )
exp ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
f m m
m M J
f m m
k t
u j i u j i j i
P j i
u t k u t k t k
 

 
 
 

 
 
Letting  mf  denote the p.d.f. of the vector
m
ir , we can write the joint probability as 
 ( , , ) ( , \ ) .m m mP j i P j i f    In order to compute the unconditional probability  ,P j i  we 
must integrate out the random vector m :  
 
 
 
(1) (2) ( )
1 1
exp ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ... (1) (2)... ( )
exp ( , ) ( , ) ( , )m m m
f m m
m m m mM J
J M
f m m
k t
u j i u j i j i
P j i f d d d J M
u t k u t k t k  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
  

 
The above probability can be computed by simulation in the following way. From the Type I 
extreme value distribution we draw R random vectors 1 2, ,...,m m mR   . Then we compute 
 
 1
1 1
exp ( , ) ( , ) ( , )1
( , ) .
exp ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
R
f m mr
M J
r
f m mr
k t
u j i u j i j i
P j i
R
u t k u t k t k
 
 
 
 

 


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3.3 Indirect Inference 
An alternative to simulated maximum likelihood is the so-called Indirect Inference approach 
(Beninger et al. 2011).  
i. Define the auxiliary model (AUX) as some model that is not the true one but we are able to 
write down the likelihood function for (e.g. the model that assume all agents face a convex 
budget). Call  the parameters of AUX. 
ii. Define the true model (TRUE) as the structural model (e.g. the model also appropriate for 
non-convex budget sets). Call   the parameters (to be estimated) of TRUE. Note: we must 
have dim( ) dim( ).   
iii. Estimate AUX on the true data and obtain parameters 0.  
iv. Calibrate the true structural model with parameters 
^
0  and generate a fake dataset 
(observed exogenous variables and simulated choices)  
v. Estimate the AUX model on fake data and obtain 
^
0  
vi. Iterate steps iv – v to obtain
^ ^
, tt 
 
 
 
 
vii. Stop the iterations when t  is close enough to 0 . The corresponding t is the Indirect 
Inference estimate of .  It can be shown to be consistent. 
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4. Empirical illustration 
The empirical exercise illustrated here applies the procedure presented in Example 2 of 
section 3.2. Household i chooses job j (=1,…, J) and share i in order to maximize:      
( , ; ) ln ( , ; ) ln ( , ; )F Mi i i i i i iW j V j V j            (13) 
where                                 
   
   
' '
' '
( ) 1( ) 1
ln ( , ; )
( ) 1(1 ) ( ) 1
ln ( , ; )
F
F
M
M
FF i
i F Fi F Fi
F F
MM i i
i M Mi M Mi
M M
L jC j
V j Z Z
L jC j
V j Z Z



   
 

   
 
   
   
      
    
   
      
  (14) 
( )iC j  = household consumption 
( )
( ) , ,
g
g
T h j
L j g F M
T

    
i = the share of household income allocated to the wife. It is not a parameter, it is a choice 
variable, in principle different for different households. 
siZ = vector of characteristics, i.e.: 
constant = 1, 
ln(age) = natural logarithm of age, 
ln(age)*ln(age), 
#children 0-5 = number of children of age 0 – 5, 
#children 6-10 = number of children of age 6 – 10, 
#children 11-16 = number of children of age 11 – 16, 
edu2 = 1[high school ], 
edu3 = 1[Bachelor], 
edu4 = 1[Master/Ph.D.], 
, , , , , , ,f f f f m m m m         = parameters to be estimated. 
i = a Type I extreme value distributed random variable. 
The estimation exercise uses a sample of 133250 couples drawn from the 2011 
Population, Wage, Employment, Income and Wage registers of Statistics Norway.   
The complete model is similar to Aaberge and Colombino (2013) and includes the 
simultaneous estimation of the earnings functions and of the opportunity density function. 
Here we only focus of the estimates of the preference parameters. 
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Note that in this example the preferences are separable in leisure and income. As a 
consequence, i  does not depend on the allocation of time (labour supply). Under the 
separability assumption, a non-structural specification of the sharing rule as a proportion of 
total household consumption would be rather harmless since the sharing decisions would not 
change across different tax-transfer regimes. We present all the same this case just as a first 
illustration of how the procedure works. 
If we observed both the chosen job and the chosen share, we could estimate the 
parameters  using the simulated probabilities      
    
 
 
exp ( , ; )
( , ; )
exp ( , ; )
i i
i i
i
m k
W j
P j
W k m
 
 



    (15) 
However, we do not observe  . Therefore we use 
 
 
 
exp ( , ; )
( ; )
exp ( , ; )
i
m
i
i
m k
W j m
P j
W k m






    (16) 
We adopt the following iterative procedure 
a. Using (4) get an estimate of  , say ˆ . 
b. For each household we estimate the chosen value i with 
 
 
ˆexp ( , ; )
ˆ
ˆexp ( , ; )
i
k
i
i
m k
W k
W k m
 
 





 
c. We re-estimate using 
 
     
 
 
ˆexp ( , ; )
ˆ( , ; )
exp ( , ; )
i i
i i
i
m k
W j
P j
W k m
 
 



    (17)
 
We then iterate steps (a) - (c) until “convergence”.  
Tables 1 and  2 show the initial and the final estimates of the preference parameters.  
 Given the above parameters one can compute the household specific values of μ. Graphs 1 
and 2 show the frequency distribution of μ computed respectively with the initial and the 
final estimates of the preference parameters. 
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It can be shown that if the utility function is Cobb-Douglas (the limit case of our Box-Cox 
specification when  and β tend to 0), the exact distribution of μ is of the Beta type (see the 
Appendix).  Although our estimated utility is not Cobb-Douglas (in fact the estimates – 
reported below – imply a much more pronounced concavity in C and L), the estimated 
distribution of μ looks close to a symmetric Beta distribution.   
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Table 1: Initial estimates 
 Female Male 
Consumption 
parameters (, )   
  
exponent () 0.458 36.6 0.444 35.5 
constant -12.611 -18.3 -10.673 -17.2 
ln(age) 6.622 17.7 5.622 16.5 
ln(age) * ln(age) -0.857 -17.0 -0.727 -15.5 
# children 0-5 0.022 4.6 0.024 5.0 
# children 6-10 -0.003 -0.6 -0.001 -0.3 
# children 11-16 0.019 4.7 0.014 3.4 
edu2 0.056 8.9 0.062 10.4 
edu3 0.126 16.1 0.126 18.2 
edu4 0.166 16.5 0.174 13.8 
     
     
Leisure  
Parameters (, γ)   
  
exponent (β) -9.278 -159.9 -11.928 -112.4 
constant 17.402 18.2 0.605 1.9 
ln(age) -9.360 -17.9 -0.359 -2.1 
ln(age) * ln(age) 1.314 18.3 0.064 2.7 
# children 0-5 0.382 40.0 0.003 1.4 
# children 6-10 0.157 21.6 -0.004 -1.9 
# childrent 11-16 0.079 13.3 -0.006 -3.4 
edu2 -0.299 -24.5 -0.026 -6.7 
edu3 -0.490 -34.6 -0.030 -6.4 
edu4 -0.618 -32.9 -0.049 -9.2 
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Table 2: Final estimates 
 Female Male 
Consumption 
parameters (, )   
  
exponent () -0.368223 -46.81 -0.346795 -45.84 
constant -11.950024 -11.97 -10.056958 -10.64 
ln(age) 6.579927 12.08 5.630644 10.75 
ln(age) * ln(age) -0.854352 -11.56 -0.730225 -10.12 
# children 0-5 0.034956 4.91 0.027288 3.62 
# children 6-10 0.008047 1.11 0.001656 0.22 
# childrent 11-16 0.034471 5.04 0.037949 5.22 
edu2 0.0995 9.96 0.100275 9.97 
edu3 0.18887 14.25 0.203056 16.84 
edu4 0.243339 13.11 0.304741 11.99 
     
     
Leisure  
Parameters (, γ)   
  
exponent (β) -8.342091 -154.21 -10.350287 -114.93 
constant 30.408136 23.56 3.235831 5.31 
ln(age) -16.171659 -22.97 -1.735691 -5.23 
ln(age) * ln(age) 2.233168 23.23 0.257602 5.71 
# children 0-5 0.520265 44.2 0.006801 1.87 
# children 6-10 0.216043 23.2 -0.007389 -2.03 
# childrent 11-16 0.105623 13.66 -0.015002 -4.33 
edu2 -0.422304 -27.01 -0.064305 -8.91 
edu3 -0.712491 -39 -0.084462 -9.96 
edu4 -0.920317 -36.84 -0.131019 -13.24 
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Appendix 
Let’s consider a special case of Example 2 where the systematic part of the utility function is 
Cobb-Douglas: 
ln( ) ln( ) ln((1 ) ) ln( )f f f m m mW a C b L a C b L           
where  is extreme value Type I. 
Notice that this is a special case of the model of Section 4 (i.e. it is the limit case when the 
exponents of the Box-Cox terms tend to zero). For simplicity, we consider wage rates fixed 
across jobs, so we simply write: 
( , )f mC C L L . 
We also assume a uniform opportunity density of hours between 0 and 1. Therefore the 
choice p.d.f. of  , ,f mL L is 
 
 
 
 
 
1
0 0 0
1
0
exp ln( ( , )) ln( ) ln((1 ) ( , )) ln( )
, ,
exp ln( ( , )) ln( ) ln((1 ) ( , )) ln( )
(1 ) ( , ))
(1 )
f f m fm m
f m
f f m f f m f m m m
f m T T
f f m f f m f m m m f m
a a a ba b
f m f m
a a
a C L L b L a C L L b L
P L L
a xC l l b l a x C l l b l dxdl dl
C L L L L
x x dx
 

   

 
 

   

   


 
 
 
  

 
0 0
0 0
.
( , ))
(1 ) ( , ))
( 1, 1)
( , ))
f m f m
f m f m f m
f m f m
T T
a a b b
f m f m f m
a a a a b b
f m f m
T T
a a b bf m
f m f m f m
C l l l l dl dl
C L L L L
a a
C l l l l dl dl
 
  
 
 





 
  
 
 
 
where B(.,.) is the Beta function. 
Notice that 
 
 
 
1
0
1
0 00 0 0
(1 ) ( , ))
( , ))
( , ))(1 ) ( , ))
f f m fm m
f m f m
f m ff f m f mm m
a a a ba b
a a bf m f m b
f m f m
T TT T
a a ba a a b ba b
f m f m f mf m f m f m
x x dx C L L L L
C L L L L
C l l l l dl dlx x dx C l l l l dl dl
 
 
  



 
 
  
 
 
 

   
 
is the (marginal) p.d.f. ( , )f mP L L . It does not involve  and therefore it cannot be used to 
estimate all the parameters (this is not the case, in general, with our model).  
The marginal p.d.f. of   is 
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 (1 )
( )
( 1, 1)
f m
a a
f m
P
a a
 




  
 
i.e. a Beta p.d.f. 
Notice that ( )
f
f m
a
E
a a




as in the deterministic case. 
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